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Abstract Many studies on electronic voting evaluate their usability in the
context of simple elections. Complex elections, which take place in many Eu-
ropean countries, also merit attention. The complexity of the voting process,
as well as that of the tallying and verification of the ballots, makes usability
even more crucial in this context. Complex elections, both paper-based and
electronic, challenge voters and electoral officials to an unusual extent. In this
work we present two studies of an electronic voting system that is tailored
to the needs of complex elections. In the first study we evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the ballot design with respect to motivating voters to verify their
ballot. Furthermore, we identify factors that motivate voters to verify, or not
to verify, their ballot. The second study also addresses the effectiveness of the
ballot design in terms of verification, but this time from the electoral officials’
perspective. Last, but not least, we evaluate the usability of the implemented
EasyVote prototype from both the voter and electoral official perspectives.
In both studies we were able to improve effectiveness, without impacting effi-
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ciency and satisfaction. Despite these usability improvements it became clear
that voters who trusted the electronic system were unlikely to verify their bal-
lots. Moreover, these voters failed to detect the “fraudulent” manipulations. It
is clear that well-formulated interventions are required in order to encourage
verification and to improve detection of errors or fraudulent attempts.
Keywords Electronic Voting · Usability · Verification · Paper Audit Trails ·
Complex Elections
1 Introduction
The idea of electronic voting machines is almost as old as the electricity that
powers them. One of the earliest efforts to develop electronic voting machines
dates back to 1875 with the model developed by Martin de Brettes [5]. Despite
public interest, none of the early electronic voting machines was ever actually
used [22]. 100 years later, in the 1970s, electronic voting machines were de-
ployed in U.S elections [43] and the Netherlands [27], and latterly in Germany
in the late 1990s [1].1
The first generation electronic voting machines2, such as those developed
by Avante, Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia and Nedap, and those from the academic
research [7, 12, 35, 36, 49], were black-box systems. Voters cast their votes us-
ing an electronic voting machine. The machine simply stored the votes to be
tallied once the election was over. Election fraud was impossible to detect if
a voting machine were compromised. Many countries, including Germany and
the Netherlands, discontinued their use of these machines.
The second generation electronic voting machines, such as those developed
by Smartmatic and those from the academic research [3, 4, 13, 48], provide
voters with an independent physical proof of their vote. Usually this is provided
in the form of a so-called paper audit trail3. Unlike the second generation
electronic voting machines, the third generation electronic voting machines [44,
45, 47] do not store the votes electronically and thus the election result is
based only on paper audit trails. These paper audit trails consist of a human-
and machine-readable parts (e.g. a QR-Code or a RFID-Chip). These can be
tallied either manually or electronically. Hence, the second and third generation
electronic voting machines, in contrast to the first generation, facilitate fraud
detection. This can be achieved by performing random audits [25, 26, 40–42].
It can also be achieved by carrying out a full manual tally, something that can
be semi-automated in case of third generation electronic voting machines.
1 For a worldwide status quo of electronic voting visit the link: http://www.e-voting.
cc/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/e-voting_worldmap_2015.pdf, last accessed 16 Novem-
ber 2015.
2 For a more detailed classification of electronic voting systems refer to [15, 18], and for
voting forms to [23].
3 The idea of paper audit trails was invented by Mercuri [30], and later associated by
Rivest and Wack with the notion of software-independence [34].
Usability of Electronic Voting Systems for Complex Elections 3
In this work we focus on the third generation electronic voting machines,
as used in Argentina [32] and Ecuador [33]. Their use is being considered in
the Netherlands [27] as proposed by [45]. In order to ensure the integrity of
the election result, these machines rely on the following assumptions being
true: (1) Voters will verify that the human-readable part of their paper audit
trail reflects their intentions; (2) Electoral officials will verify that the human-
readable part matches the machine-readable part.
Unfortunately, a number of studies [2, 14, 19, 38] showed that voters were
unlikely to verify their paper audit trails. This is curious because such study
participants often consider paper audit trails to be important [29]. Even elec-
toral officials might not verify as effectively as they ought to. The two as-
sumptions become even more unrealistic in the context of complex elections,
i.e. elections with complex ballots and voting rules. Hence, the goal of this
work was to test the validity of these assumptions in the context of complex
elections.
In order to achieve our goal we focus on the local elections in Hesse (as
an exemplar of a complex election) and on the EasyVote voting scheme [45],
based on the findings presented in [10] and the fact that we could use and
adapt the open source EasyVote prototype4. The contribution of this work
can be summarised as follows:
1. For complex elections, we carry out an initial investigation into:
– the validity of the assumptions underlying the use of third generation
electronic voting machines, both from the voter and the electoral official
perspectives.
– the usability5 of a third generation electronic voting machine prototype
in accordance with the ISO 9421-11 standard [20].
– voter perceptions with respect to the verification of the human-readable
part of the paper audit trail.
– factors that motivate voters to verify, or not to verify, the paper audit
trail.
2. We propose a research design for testing hypotheses related to ballot veri-
fication by voters and electoral officials.
A subsequent investigation with a larger number of participants is required to
follow up our findings, in order to confirm our results.
2 Background
In this Section we first describe the local elections in Hesse. We then briefly
introduce the EasyVote voting scheme [45] and describe the components of
the EasyVote ballot. Lastly we introduce the definition of usability according
to the ISO 9421-11 standard [20].
4 https://github.com/SecUSo/EasyVote, last accessed 16 November 2015.
5 According to Volkamer et al. [46] evaluating the usability of electronic voting systems
is important and critical for trust establishment.
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2.1 Local elections in Hesse
In this Section we describe the vote casting and tallying process in Hesse local
elections.
2.1.1 Vote casting process
The vote casting process in the Hesse local elections is similar to elections in
Luxembourg, Belgium and other German states (Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg),
in that it shares similar voting rules. In the following text we introduce the
concrete Hesse voting rules for local elections by using the city of Darmstadt
as an example:
– The voter can cast 71 direct votes.6
– The voter can assign up to three votes to each candidate (cumulative vot-
ing).
– The voter can cast votes to candidates of different parties (vote splitting).
– The voter can select only a party.
– The voter can cross out candidates.
If the voter selects a party, the votes that are not directly cast are au-
tomatically assigned to the candidates of the selected party according to the
list order7. By being able to cross out candidates the voter can influence the
automatic vote assignments when a party is selected. Depending on the size of
the district more than ten parties and more than 450 candidates participate
in elections, which results in huge ballots, shown in Figure 1. Since this un-
doubtedly leads to error, so-called healing rules are applied during the tallying
process:
– If the voter casts more than 71 direct votes for candidates of one party,
only 71 votes are tallied.
– If the voter selects more than one party, and casts fewer than, or equal to,
71 direct votes, only the direct votes are tallied.
These healing rules aim to validate a ballot which might be interpreted as
invalid according to the strict letter of the rules.
2.1.2 Tallying process
The tallying process consists of two phases carried out by electoral officials
and monitored by an electoral officer. The first phase of the tallying process
starts at the end of the election day. Electoral officials are required to perform
the following steps:
6 Note that the maximal number of votes a voter can cast, is determined by the number
of seats in the parliament.
7 Note that the automatic assignments of votes takes place in the tallying process.
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Fig. 1: Ballot of the local elections in Darmstadt 2011 (Size: 27” x 35”).
1. Open the ballot boxes and ensure that the number of cast ballots matches
the number of voters marked off in the electoral register.
2. Classify ballots into four categories: (1) Only a party is selected; (2) Candi-
dates are directly selected (and a party is selected); (3) Invalid; (4) Cannot
be assigned to any of the other categories.
3. Verify that ballots are correctly classified.
4. Manually tally the ballots of the 1st category according to the selected
party.
5. Review ballots of the 4th category and assign them to the 1st, 2nd or 3rd
category.
6. Manually tally the intermediate result, by considering only the ballots of
the 1st and 3rd category.
The second phase takes place the day after the election. During this phase
the ballots of the second category are tallied, and electoral officials are sup-
ported by tallying software, namely the PC-Wahl8. Electoral officials have to
perform the following steps:
1. Enter the intermediate result from the first phase into the PC-Wahl.
2. Enter the first five ballots into the PC-Wahl.
3. Manually tally the first five ballots.
4. Verify that the outcome of the second and third step matches.9
5. Enter the rest of the ballots into the PC-Wahl.
6. Compute the final election result with PC-Wahl.
8 http://www.pcwahl.de/, last accessed 16 November 2015.
9 The PC-Wahl software is assumed to be trustworthy. Thus, this step serves as a self-
control for the electoral officials.
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7. Sign the printed disposition.
The process of entering ballots into PC-Wahl is performed by three elec-
toral officials. The first electoral official narrates the voter’s selection(s) on
the ballot, the second enters them into the PC-Wahl, and the third verifies
the correctness the process. Figure 2 shows the PC-Wahl interface for enter-
ing/recording the ballots.
Fig. 2: The interface of PC-Wahl to enter/record the ballots.
Electoral officials who participate in the second phase are employees of
the corresponding municipality and are therefore considered to have sufficient
technical expertise. They participate in a introductory workshop to familiarise
them with the PC-Wahl software. During the workshop, which usually lasts 30
minutes, the electoral officials have the opportunity to try out the PC-Wahl
software.
2.2 The EasyVote voting scheme
In this Section we provide an overview of the EasyVote voting scheme which
was first proposed by Volkamer et al. [45].
2.2.1 Vote casting process
During the vote casting process the voter identifies him or herself to the elec-
toral officials, as is customary for traditional (paper-based) elections. The voter
then enters the voting booth to use the electronic voting machine. The voter
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prepares the ballot by selecting the preferred candidates on the voting ma-
chine. The voting machine supports and provides feedback about the current
state of the ballot, specifically whether it is valid or not. The ballot is printed
when the voter confirms his/her final selections. Electronic data are not re-
tained on the machine after printing. The printed ballot consists of two parts
that represent the cast votes: human- and machine-readable parts. The voter
verifies that the human-readable part reflects his/her selected candidates then
folds the printed ballot, exits the voting booth and deposits the ballot into the
sealed ballot box.
2.2.2 Tallying process
During the tallying process electoral officials ensure that the number of cast
ballots is equal to the number of voters. Afterwards electoral officials start
tallying/scanning each individual ballot. Electoral officials scan the QR-Code
and ensure that its content, as displayed on the monitor, matches the human-
readable part of the ballot. After electoral officials have verified the content,
and confirmed its correctness, the scanned ballot is added to the intermediate
result, shown on a second monitor. Electoral officials, and the general public,
can verify that the ballot is added correctly to the intermediate result. They
repeat this process for all ballots.
2.3 EasyVote ballot
Figure 3 introduces the components of the EasyVote ballot, as proposed by
Budurushi et al. [9].
Fig. 3: The components of the EasyVote ballot.
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2.4 Usability
In order to evaluate the usability of the EasyVote prototype, specifically the
vote casting and tallying components, we used the ISO 9421-11 standard [20].
According to ISO 9421-11 usability comprises the following three components:
– Effectiveness (the ability of users to complete their task).
– Efficiency (the extent to which users consume resource to perform their
task).
– Satisfaction (the level of satisfaction users experience in performing their
task).
These components are defined with respect to the context of use.
3 Preliminary considerations
In this Section we introduce some preliminary considerations that are shared
by both studies presented in this work.
3.1 Communicated research goal
The main challenge in the area of usable security is to avoid the potential
social desirability bias [24], otherwise participants may act in a manner per-
ceived to be socially desirable rather than acting as they actually would in
a voting situation [39]. To offset social desirability a fictitious research goal
was communicated instead of the actual research goal. Hence, participants of
both studies were told that goal was to evaluate the usability of, and actively
feed into, the implemented prototype by following the human-centred design
principles for interactive systems [20,21].
3.2 Participants’ experience with electronic voting
Participants in both studies were used to the paper-based voting system, be-
cause the use of electronic voting in Germany has been discontinued since
the introduction of the principle of public nature of elections by the German
Federal Constitutional Court in 2009 [17].
3.3 Ethical considerations
An ethics commission at the authors’ university lays down ethical requirements
for research involving humans10. These requirements were met; all participants
10 http://www.intern.tu-darmstadt.de/gremien/ethikkommisson/index.en.jsp, last
accessed 16 November 2015.
Usability of Electronic Voting Systems for Complex Elections 9
in both studies read and signed the declaration of consent for participating in
the study. Furthermore, at the end of the study, participants were debriefed re-
garding the actual research goal. Note that participants were able to interrupt
and leave the study at any time without needing to provide a reason.
4 Study 1: Evaluation of the vote casting process
The primary goal of the study was to determine whether participants would
deliberately detect manipulations of their printed ballot. We intentionally and
randomly manipulated participants’ ballots. We also evaluated the usability
of the implemented prototype according to the ISO 9421-11 standard [20].
4.1 Methodology
4.1.1 Cover story
In order to conceal our primary goal, in addition to the communicated research
goal introduced in Section 3.1, we used a cover story. Participants were told
that they were taking part in a research study that emerged from a collabo-
ration between the computer science and political science departments of the
Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt. The stated research focus was said to be
twofold: firstly political and secondly human-centred usability focused, as fol-
lows. (1) The political science department is interested in the development of
democracy in Germany. Hence, the research study aimed to compare citizens’
interest and motivation to actively participate in politics. The study claimed
to conduct a comparison between citizens involved in the 1960s protest move-
ments and the citizens of today. To achieve this participants are asked to cast
a vote in an election forecast of forthcoming local elections. Furthermore, to
strengthen the credibility of this research focus, we used real candidate names
and parties. (2) The computer science department is interested in the gen-
eral acceptability of electronic voting and in evaluating the usability of the
implemented EasyVote prototype.
4.1.2 Introducing manipulations: Altering the printed ballot
The manipulations used in the present study are:
1. Exchange a party, including its candidates.
2. Exchange a crossed-out candidate.
3. Exchange a directly selected candidate.
4. Exchange votes between directly selected candidates.
This set includes all manipulations used in similar previous studies [16,
38]. We intentionally and randomly manipulated the ballots by introducing
one of the manipulations presented above. However, in order to ensure that
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manipulations were non-trivial to detect, we introduced manipulations in a
pseudo-random fashion based on the participant’s direct selection(s) as follows,
based on the following dependencies:
1. The participant selects only a party, implying that only the manipula-
tion Exchange a party, including its candidates can be introduced.
2. The participant selects only a party and crosses out at least one candidate,
implying that only the manipulation Exchange a crossed out candidate is
randomly introduced.
3. The participant selects only one direct candidate (in combination with
selecting a party), implying that only the manipulation Exchange a directly
selected candidate is randomly introduced.
4. The participant selects one direct candidate, a party and crosses out at
least one candidate of the selected party, implying that either Exchange a
crossed out candidate or Exchange a directly selected candidate is randomly
introduced.
5. The participant selects direct candidates and assigns them the same num-
ber of votes (in combination with selecting a party), implying that only
the manipulation Exchange a directly selected candidate is randomly intro-
duced.
6. The participant selects direct candidates, assigns them the same number
of votes, and selects a party and crosses out at least one candidate of
the selected party, implying that either Exchange a crossed out candidate
or Exchange a directly selected candidate is randomly introduced.
7. The participant selects direct candidates and assigns them a different num-
ber of votes (in combination with selecting a party), implying that ei-
ther Exchange a directly selected candidate or Exchange votes between di-
rectly selected candidates is randomly introduced.
8. The participant selects direct candidates, assigns them a different number
of votes, and selects a party and crosses out at least one candidate of
the selected party, implying that either Exchange a crossed out candidate
or Exchange a directly selected candidate or Exchange votes between directly
selected candidates is randomly introduced.
Note that the second and fourth manipulation change only the distribution
of cast votes. The first and third manipulation introduce new content, e.g. a
new party and/or new candidate(s), into the printed ballot.
4.1.3 Questionnaires
Pre-questionnaire. This questionnaire helps us to conceal our primary
goal by assessing participants’ general interest in politics.
Post-questionnaire. This questionnaire serves to compare the results of
our study with the results presented by Budurushi et al. [11]. Thus, we compare
participants’ self-reported answers and their actual behaviour with respect to
verifying their printed ballot. To assess participants’ perceptions regarding
the verification of the printed ballot, we extended this questionnaire with the
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following two statements: (1) I perceived verification of the printed ballot to
be a demanding task ; and (2) I perceived verification of the printed ballot to
be an error prone task. Furthermore, in order to identify the participants’
motivations, either to verify, or not to verify, the printed ballot, we extended
the questionnaire with the following open question: What motivated you to (or
not to) verify the printed ballot?.
4.1.4 Evaluation
To evaluate the usability of the implemented vote casting prototype we defined
the usability components introduced in Section 2.4, according to our context
as follows:
Effectiveness: The ability of participants to cast their vote, i.e. to cast a
printed ballot that reflects their intention. The vote-casting task included the
following sub-tasks, requiring the participant to:
1. commence the vote casting process.
2. makes a selection(s).
3. print the ballot.
4. verify that the printed ballot reflects his/her intention, i.e. the participant
detects the manipulations if they are present.
We measured effectiveness by observing the vote-casting process and filling
in a check-list, with a box for each of these sub-tasks. Note that while mea-
suring effectiveness we implicitly evaluated our primary goal: if participants
detected that their printed ballot has been manipulated.
Efficiency: The time spent by participants to cast their vote. The following
times are measured:
1. Time spent to read the voting rules.
2. Time spent to make selection(s).
3. Time spent to verify the printed ballot.
To measure the Time spent to read the voting rules we used a stopwatch
and observed the enabling device. More specifically we measured the time
between two events: (1) Participant enters the voting booth; and (2) The red
LED of the enabling device light turning on.
Further, the implemented prototype software measured the time spent to
make selection(s), i.e. the time interval between starting to make selection(s)
and starting the printing process. In order to measure the Time spent to verify
the printed ballot we first measured the total time a participant spent in the
voting booth and the average time the prototype software takes to print the
ballot. Afterwards, we subtracted the time spent to read the voting rules, time
spent to make selection(s) and the average time the prototype takes to print
the ballot from the total time that the participant spent in the voting booth.
Satisfaction: The level of satisfaction participants experience in casting
their vote. In order to measure satisfaction we used a German translation of
the original SUS questionnaire [6], as improved by [28].
12 Jurlind Budurushi et al.
Finally, we conducted a qualitative analysis of the participants’ responses,
provided in response to the questionnaire’s open questions. An open coding
approach was applied. The authors independently reviewed these responses
and came up with a list of codes (i.e. reasons that motivate participants to
verify or to not verify their printed ballot). We considered each code, even
if several codes were mentioned by a single participant. The identified codes
were discussed and agreed upon by the authors.
4.2 Experimental setup, design and procedure
The experiments were carried out in our lab. The participants were randomly
assigned to two groups: a control and a treatment group.
The treatment group was provided with the stimulus proposed by Budu-
rushi et al. [11]: pre-printed verification instructions on the reverse of the
printed ballot. The control group was provided with a printed ballot with
nothing printed on the reverse. Note that we adapted the verification instruc-
tions due to the different election context addressed in the present study and
the one addressed in [11]. More specifically, we replaced the upper picture
and extended the first sentence with an orange highlighted and underlined
adjective, namely “orange marked”. Figure 4 shows the adapted instructions.
Fig. 4: The adapted verification instructions (English translation).
In the experiment each participant had to perform the following steps:
1. Read and sign the declaration of consent for participating in the study.
2. Read the cover story.
3. Fill in the demographics.
4. Fill in the questionnaire regarding the political interest.
5. Read the poster describing the vote casting process, in order to become
familiar with it.11
11 Note that if participants had questions regarding the vote casting process while reading
the poster, they could ask the experimenter.
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6. Cast a vote12 and deposit the printed ballot into the appropriate ballot
box.
7. Fill in the post-questionnaire.
8. Fill in the SUS questionnaire.
9. Debrief: Reveal the actual research goal.
If participants were not able to summarise the vote casting process cor-
rectly, the experimenter described the correct vote casting process by using the
poster. If a participant detected a manipulation, debriefing took place before
filling in the post-questionnaire. Furthermore, in order to ensure vote secrecy,
the experimenter instructed all participants that detected the manipulation to
fold and deposit their ballots into the ballot box.
4.3 Recruiting and sampling
Participants were recruited via flyers and by personal contact. 44 subjects
participated (14 female, 30 male), ranging in age from 20-75, with an average
age of 31.45 years (σ = 13.44) and a median age of 25. One participant had
completed an apprenticeship; 20 participants had a high school degree or less;
and the rest of the participants had a bachelor’s degree or equivalent.
All participants were na¨ıve with respect to the purpose of the study. In
order to encourage participation we provided e10 per participant.
4.4 Materials
The materials used in the study were:
– A voting terminal, consisting of a touchscreen monitor, a computer, an
enabling device and a printer.
– A voting booth.
– A poster that describes the vote casting process hanging on the outside of
the voting booth.
– A shredder.
– The implemented vote casting prototype.
– Two ballot boxes, to separate ballots into two categories: (1) Manipulation
detected ; and (2) Manipulation not detected.13
– Ballots.
12 Participants in the voting booth could print only one ballot, as proposed by Budurushi et
al. [8]. If the participant wanted to cast a different vote from the one already printed, he/she
was required to leave the voting booth, privately destroy the printed ballot, and re-enter the
voting booth.
13 Note that in the study the ballot boxes were not labelled and one of the ballot boxes
was hidden in order not to confuse or bias the participants.
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4.5 Results
The findings are reported in terms of Usability evaluation and Participants’
perception towards verification.
4.5.1 Usability
Effectiveness. Figure 5 presents the percentage of participants that were
able to cast a vote successfully, i.e. to cast a printed ballot that reflects their
intention, according to the sub-tasks defined in Section 4.1.4.
Fig. 5: The percentage of successful participants able to cast a printed ballot
that reflects their intention.
The participants in the treatment group detected the randomly introduced
manipulations more frequently with 81.81% (18 out of 22) compared to 36.36%
(8 out of 22) of participants in the control group. In order to determine if there
is a relationship between the stimulus and detecting manipulations between
both groups, we ran a Chi-square test. The Chi-square test suggested that
there is a significant difference in detecting the manipulation between the
treatment and the control group (χ2 = (1, N = 44) = 9.402, p < 0.002).
Furthermore, Figure 6 provides an overview of the frequency of occurrence
for each manipulation category, and whether a manipulation was detected
or not. The manipulation categories considered in the present study are as
follows:
1. Exchange a party, including its candidates.
2. Exchange a crossed-out candidate.
3. Exchange a directly selected candidate.
4. Exchange votes between directly selected candidates.
Efficiency. Figure 7 presents the average time spent by participants to
cast a vote, according to the sub-tasks defined in Section 4.1.4.
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Fig. 6: Frequency of occurrence for each manipulation category.
Fig. 7: Average time (in seconds) spent by participants to cast their vote.
Satisfaction. The scoring of the completed SUS questionnaires resulted
in an average value of 79.94 (σ = 13.74), which, according to Sauro’s nor-
malisation method [37], can be interpreted as a grade of B. Consequently, the
prototype has a high perceived usability. Furthermore, in order to analyse the
impact of detecting the manipulation on the participants’ satisfaction we eval-
uated the questionnaires separately. While the scoring of the completed SUS
questionnaire from the participants that detected the manipulation resulted
in a score of 80 (σ = 14.78), the scoring from those that did not detect the
manipulation resulted in 79.86 (σ = 13.07). Finally, the SUS questionnaires
for those in the treatment group resulted in 79.29 (σ = 13.80), and those in
the control group resulted in a score of 80 (σ = 13.11).
4.5.2 Participants’ perception towards verification
In this sub-section we report our findings based on a qualitative analysis of
the corresponding open questions. Since our analysis was qualitative and ex-
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ploratory we do not provide the number of people who mentioned a specific
argument.
We evaluated participants’ self-reported answers and their actual behaviour
with respect to verifying the printed ballot and detecting the manipulation.
In total 19 participants did not detect the manipulation. However in the post-
questionnaire, 17 out of the 19 claimed to have verified their printed ballots.
Figure 8 presents participants’ opinion regarding the statement I perceived
verification of the printed ballot to be a demanding task, while Figure 9 depicts
responses to: I perceived verification of the printed ballot to be error prone.
Fig. 8: I think that verifying the printed ballot is demanding.
Fig. 9: I think that verifying the printed ballot is error prone.
Furthermore, by evaluating participants’ responses to the question “What
motivated you to (or not to) verify the printed ballot?” we identified five codes
reflecting participants’ decision to verify the printed ballot:
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1. One’s own attitude to verification.
2. Technology is error prone, i.e. not trustworthy.
3. Verification instructions (the reverse of the printed ballot and/or poster of
the vote casting process).
4. Elections and vote integrity are important.
5. Unknown voting system.
Moreover we identified only a single code that influenced participants not to
verify the printed ballot, namely Trust in the system. Furthermore, only one of
the participants in each code category, except the first one, did not detect the
manipulation. While the opposite is true for Trust in the system, where only
one of the participants detected the manipulation. Some of the participants in
the code category One’s own attitude to verify did detect the manipulation.
4.6 Discussion and limitations
Our results show that the stimulus developed and proposed by Budurushi et
al. [11] had a significant impact with respect to motivating voters to verify
their printed ballot and thereby to detect manipulations. We could confirm
the results achieved by Budurushi et al. [11] regarding the number of partici-
pants that verified the printed ballot and detected the manipulation, and also
regarding the difference between participants’ self-reported answers and their
actual behaviour with respect to verifying the printed ballot and detection of
manipulations.
Furthermore, the act of verifying the printed ballot and detection of the
manipulation played a role in effectiveness. We identified a significant improve-
ment in effectiveness due to the presence of the stimulus. Significantly more
manipulations were detected when the stimulus was present, but no signifi-
cant difference was found with respect to efficiency and satisfaction between
the treatment and the control groups and between the participants that did
detect the manipulation as opposed to those who did not. These findings reveal
that the stimulus has a positive impact on the usability and security (verifi-
cation) of the EasyVote voting scheme. In addition, 80% of the participants
considering verification of the printed ballot to be easy and approximately
30% of them perceived it to be error prone. Thus, it is important to identify,
analyse and minimise the factors, which, according to the participants, make
the act of verifying error prone.
While analysing the different reasons that participants cited for verifying,
or not verifying, their printed ballot, we found out that participants’ who trust
the system do not verify their printed ballot nor do they detect manipulations.
Hence, it is of crucial importance for the country’s democratic process to find
ways to improve this before any such system is deployed in practice. One
way to address this issue is to identify and deploy appropriate and effective
risk communication strategies. Moreover, such strategies should increase voter
awareness regarding possible risks without impairing their willingness to adopt
the electronic voting system.
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The limitation of the present study is that participants in this sample might
be more interested in politics, being self-selecting, than the general electorate.
As a result, these individuals may be more likely to verify their printed ballot
and detect the manipulations than a typical voter. As such, the prevalence
of verification of the printed ballot and detection of the manipulations may
be biased relative to the general electorate. Moreover, we made the manipu-
lation reporting very simple, while in genuine elections this may require strict
organisational protocols, perhaps a signed form. Finally, in legally binding elec-
tions the results regarding the verification and detecting manipulations may
be slightly different than in a non-legally binding election forecast. Hence,
the number of voters that verify and detect manipulations might be different,
depending whether the participation in the election is compulsory or free.
5 Study 2: Evaluation of the tallying process
This section describes the study in which we evaluated the tallying process.
The goal of the study was to determine whether participants acting as election
officials would detect discrepancies while performing the tallying process. They
would be comparing the human-readable part of the ballot and the data dis-
played on the monitor. The task of verifying that the human-readable part of
the ballot matches the data displayed on the monitor, i.e. the data stored in the
QR-Code, is particularly important with respect to the integrity of the elec-
tion result and therefore should be evaluated. We intentionally manipulated
the QR-Codes of some ballots and randomly inserted them into the total set of
ballots to be tallied. We also evaluated the usability of the prototype software
according to the ISO 9421-11 standard [20].
5.1 Methodology
In this section we introduce the methodology used to achieve the goals of this
study.
5.1.1 Manipulations: Introducing discrepancies
The different manipulations that were used in our study are as follows:
1. Remove votes from a candidate and assign them to another candidate.
2. Remove votes from a candidate and do not re-assign them.
3. Remove a candidate and insert another candidate instead.
4. Remove a candidate.
5. Remove a party, including its candidates.
6. Assign automatically distributed votes incorrectly.
This set includes all manipulations used in similar previous studies [14,16].
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We manipulated only six out of the 89 ballots to be tallied in order to
cover all type of manipulations while minimising the probability of guessing
the actual goal of the study. We randomly selected six ballots and introduced
the manipulations according to a random permutation. Finally, we confronted
each group with a different random order of the same six manipulations.
5.1.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the usability of the implemented tallying prototype we defined the
usability components introduced in section 2.4, as follows:
Effectiveness: The ability of participants to tally the correct election re-
sult, i.e. participants detect the introduced manipulations. Note that we did
not define any further sub-tasks to measure effectiveness, because, in contrast
to the vote-casting study (Section 4), participants are trained to use the tal-
lying prototype. Hence, by measuring effectiveness we implicitly realised our
primary goal, namely to determine whether participants were able to detect
the discrepancies we introduced.
Efficiency: The time spent by participants to tally the election result. We
further measured time as follows:
1. Time spent to tally the first five ballots.
2. Time spent to manually tally the first five ballots and verify that the final
tally matches the electronic outcome.
3. Time spent tallying the rest of the ballots.
We used a stopwatch to measure the time spent during the above steps.
Satisfaction: The level of satisfaction participants experienced in tally-
ing the election result. In order to measure satisfaction we used a German
translation of the original SUS questionnaire [6], as improved by [28].
5.2 Experimental setup, design and procedure
The experiments, including the training sessions, were carried out in our lab,
which provides all the necessary equipment, e.g. a table, a laptop, a printer,
chairs, monitors, and a projector. 48 participants were randomly assigned to 24
different groups of two participants. Each group had to perform the following
steps:
1. Read and sign the declaration of consent for participating in the study.
2. Participate in the training workshop.
3. Tally the ballots with the implemented prototype.
4. Debrief: Reveal the actual research goal.
Participants of a group were randomly assigned to perform the follow-
ing tasks, independently: (1) Operate the prototype; (2) Scan the QR-Codes.
However, both participants had to verify that the data shown on the monitor
matched the human-readable part of the ballot.
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Furthermore, participants randomly verified the correctness of the algo-
rithm to automatically assign votes and that of intermediate results. Hence,
for each group we randomly selected 10 out of the 89 ballots, and required
participants to verify all votes (directly and automatically assigned), i.e. not
only those highlighted in orange. Furthermore, participants were required to
randomly select five candidates on each of these ballots to verify that votes
were correctly recorded. Participants compared the number of votes before
and after in order to confirm that the human-readable part matched the data
displayed on the monitor.
5.3 Recruiting and sampling
The participants were recruited via e-mail, advertising in social networks and
flyers. 48 subjects participated (19 female, 29 male), who ranged in age from
18-54, with an average age of 25.67 years (σ = 7.5) and a median age of 24.
Five participants had completed an apprenticeship; 29 participants had a high
school degree or less; and 13 participants had a bachelor’s degree or equivalent.
One participant did not specify his/her level of education.
All participants were na¨ıve with respect to the purpose of the study. Three
different incentives encouraged participation. First, the employees of our uni-
versity were interested in science and wanted to support our research. Some
were psychology students, who are required by their school to participate in
30 hours of research studies. We compensated them with credit for the appro-
priate amount of hours. The rest of the participants were given e10 each.
5.4 Materials
In this section we list the materials used in the present study:
– The implemented tallying prototype.
– A training workshop presentation.
– 89 original electronic filled ballots from the local elections in Hesse 2011.
The ballots contained directly selected candidates and/or a party.
– Five training ballots to be used during in the training workshop: Three
ballots with candidates and a party selected, and two ballots that also
contained crossed out candidates. Two of the five ballots required corre-
sponding corrections by the participants.
5.5 Results
None of the first groups detected all introduced discrepancies. We thus termi-
nated the experiment, and analysed and improved the study design.
After a systematic analysis and comparison of our study design and the
tallying process in the local elections in Hesse, see 2.1.2, we identified reading
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voters’ selection(s) out loud during the tallying process as the only difference.
Therefore, we changed our study design slightly and required participants to
read voters’ selection(s) out loud during the verification process. They check
whether the data displayed on the monitor matches the human-readable part
of the ballot during verification. This intervention significantly improved per-
formance in comparison to our first run.
We include results from both runs of the study here. The first run consisted
of four groups, which fall under the category Silent, as participants silently
verified that the data shown on the monitor matched the human-readable
part of the ballot. The second run consisted of 20 groups, which fell under
the category Reading out loud. Note that due to the different group sizes, the
separate evaluation regarding effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction aims
only to provide a comprehensive record of the achieved results.
Effectiveness. Figure 10 presents the ability of participants to tally the
correct election result, i.e. whether the participants detected the manipula-
tions.
Fig. 10: The ability of participants to tally the correct election result.
Efficiency. Figure 11 presents the average time spent by participants tal-
lying the election result according to the sub-tasks defined in section 5.1.2.
Satisfaction. The scoring of the completed SUS questionnaires resulted
in an average value of 82.7 (σ = 12.01). According to Sauro’s normalisation
method [37] this value can be interpreted as a grade of A. Thus, the prototype
is likely to be recommended. Furthermore, in order to analyse the impact of
Reading out loud on the participants’ satisfaction we evaluated the question-
naires separately. While the scoring of the completed SUS questionnaire from
the silent participants resulted in a score of 86.25 (σ = 5.99). The scoring from
those that read out loud while verifying resulted in 82.29 (σ = 12.03).
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Fig. 11: Time (in minutes) spent by participants to tally the election result.
5.6 Discussion and limitations
We observed a significant increase with respect to effectiveness when the par-
ticipants (electoral officials) read direct selections out loud while verifying.
There were significant improvements in detecting the manipulations due to
Reading out loud. However, due to the different group sizes, by extrapolat-
ing our results we can only assume that Reading out loud has no significant
influence regarding efficiency and satisfaction.
There are two main limitations in the present study: First, the results
regarding effectiveness might be similar, even when direct selections are not
highlighted in orange, as introduced in [45]. Nevertheless, a significant differ-
ence, with respect to efficiency and satisfaction, can be assumed. Hence, in
order to achieve better results with respect to effectiveness, efficiency and sat-
isfaction, we suggest deploying both interventions (reading direct selections
out loud and highlighting them in orange). The second limitation is that most
of the participants in this sample were university students, and they are un-
likely to be representative of the larger population (electoral officials) with
respect to age and educational level. However, in legally binding elections the
results regarding the verification and detecting manipulations may be slightly
different, depending on whether electoral officials support similar or different
electoral goals.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we report on an evaluation of the usability of a third-generation
electronic voting machine in the context of complex elections. The evaluation
was carried out to asses voter and electoral official perspectives. To the best of
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our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind with respect to the challenges
and context it addresses.
The results of the first study, in which we evaluated the vote-casting pro-
cess, show that the stimulus developed and proposed by Budurushi et al. [11]
delivered a significant impact with respect to motivating voters to verify their
printed ballot and detecting manipulations. In addition, the act of verifying
the printed ballot and detecting the manipulation played a role in effectiveness.
However, we identified a significant improvement with respect to effectiveness
due to the presence of the stimulus. While there were significant improvements
in detecting manipulation due to the stimulus presence, there were no signif-
icant difference regarding efficiency and satisfaction between the treatment
and the control groups and between the participants that detected the manip-
ulation and those who did not. These findings reveal that the stimulus has a
positive impact on the usability and security (verification) of the EasyVote vot-
ing scheme. Furthermore, we observed out that participants’ who trusted the
system did not verify their printed ballots nor did they detect manipulations.
Hence, for future work we plan to identify an adequate risk communication
strategy, in order to address this sector of the population. As future work we
also plan to replicate this study with the an alternative ballot design, and
evaluate its impact on detecting manipulations.
In the second study we observed a significant improvement with respect
to effectiveness when the participants (electoral official) read direct selections
out loud while verifying. There were significant improvements in detecting
the manipulations due to Reading out loud. However, due to the unbalanced
groups, we cannot prove that Reading out loud has a significant impact on
efficiency and satisfaction.
In conclusion, based on Neff’s reasoning [31], the results of both studies
show that using a stimulus and reading direct selections out loud makes de-
tection of election fraud significantly more likely.
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